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Holder v. Hall: Sizing Up Vote Dilution in the '90s
If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be
found in democracy, they will best be attained when all
persons alike share in the government to the utmost.1
Though written over 2,000 years ago, Aristotle's profound words
ring true to this day and find their embodiment in the most basic of
our American entitlements: the right to vote. Unfortunately, his
noble vision of equal participation has not been fully realized in our
modem republic, all too often drowned in waves of factious
domination and public complacence. In the generations since our
nation's birth, courts and legislative bodies have labored to define the
right to vote and divine what that right requires in the treatment of
the individual citizen. During that struggle to wade through the
"political thicket"2 of representational ideology, the right has at
different times been denied, abridged, ignored, and sullied. In recent
years, the suffrage debate has focused on a particular problem-vote
dilution.3
The Supreme Court recently confronted for the first time a vote
dilution challenge to the size of a governing body under section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.' In Holder v. Hall,' a group of
1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, c.322 B.C., quoted in THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 84 (David
E. Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986).
2. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
3. Minority (whether political, ethnic or racial) vote dilution has been defined as "a
process whereby election laws or practices, either singly or in concert, combine with
systematic bloc voting among an identifiable majority group to diminish or cancel the
voting strength of at least one minority group." CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING:
THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr IN PERSPECTIVE 24 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson
eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONTROVERSIES].
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). What was formerly § 2 now provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42 U.S.C.S. § 1973(f)(2)], as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
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minority black voters challenged their county's single-commissioner
system of government, claiming that it diluted their vote in violation
of section 2.6 Five members of the Court rejected the challenge on
the ground that no "objective alternative benchmark" existed by
which to measure the dilutive effects of a governing authority's size.'
However, a different combination of five Justices found that
governmental size was subject to at least threshold coverage under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.' The case resulted in a judicial
constriction of the Act, as the Court denied voting minorities the right
to challenge a governing body's size under a dilution theory absent
proof of intentional discrimination.9
This Note first provides a brief description of the case's factual
and legal background. 0 It then describes the evolution of voting
rights jurisprudence, focusing primarily on developments since passage
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.11 The Note next examines the
decision in detail, analyzes its various lines of argument," and
suggests some alternative solutions to the problem of securing
effective political participation for all citizens.' The Note concludes
that Holder is emblematic of the Rehnquist Court's increasingly
conservative view of the Voting Rights Act and provides little
guidance to the lower federal courts concerning the core issues of
voting rights jurisprudence. 4
Bleckley County is a rural county in central Georgia."5 Since its
establishment in 1912, the county has been governed by a single
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, [t]hat
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
5. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (plurality opinion).
6. Id. at 2584.
7. Id. at 2588, 2591; see infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
8. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2619; see infra notes 101-36 and accompanying text.
9. See id. at 2588.
10. See infra notes 15-41 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 42-99 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 100-67 and accompanying text.
13. See ihfra notes 171-89 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text. On the same day it decided
Holder, the Court handed down its decision in Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647
(1994), a Florida reapportionment case. De Grandy and Holder both evidence the Court's
increasing unwillingness to broaden the vote dilution inquiry. See infra note 199 and
accompanying text for a brief discussion of De Grandy.
15. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2584 (1994).
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county commissioner,"6 as authorized by Georgia law.'7 Under this
system, the Bleckley County Commissioner performs all of the
executive and legislative functions of the county government,
including levying general and special taxes, directing and controlling
all county property, and settling all claims.' According to the 1990
census, Bleckley County's population numbers 10,430, over twenty-
two percent of which is black. 9 The voting-age population for
Bleckley County is 19% black and 80% white, and the voter
registration level for both groups is approximately 70%.'
In 1985, the Georgia legislature authorized Bleckley County to
adopt a multi-member county commission, consisting of five commis-
sioners elected from single-member districts and a single chairman
elected at large.2 The county's voters rejected this proposition in a
1986 referendum, by a vote of 1156 to 887.z In 1985, six registered
black voters from Bleckley County and the Cochran/Bleckley County
Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) challenged the single-commissioner system in a suit
filed against petitioners Jackie Holder, the incumbent county
commissioner, and Probate Judge Robert Johnson, the superinten-
16. Bleckley County also has one sheriff, probate judge, clerk of superior court, tax
commissioner, coroner, school superintendent, county surveyor, and magistrate, each of
whom is elected by a majority of all the voters in Bleckley County. Brief for the
Petitioners at 4 n.1, Holder, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (No. 91-2012).
17. See GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-3(7) (Supp. 1994). In addition to Bleckley County,
about 10 of Georgia's other 159 counties use the single-commissioner system; the rest
maintain multi-member commissions. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2584.
18. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-5-22.1 (1993).
19. Brief for the Petitioners at 4 n.2, Holder (No. 91-2012).
20. Id. at 6.
21. 1985 GA. LAWS 4406. The five-member commission is a popular form of
governing authority in Georgia. See infra note 145.
22. Brief for the Petitioners at 6, Holder (No. 91-2012). At trial, Dr. Bernadette
Loftin, an historian and resident of Bleckley County, testified to the effect that the
referendum was not introduced to combat any perceived discriminatory motive behind the
commissioner scheme. Id. at 7. Rather, it was recommended by the Bleckley County
grand jury because of voter dissatisfaction with a tax increase (taxation was controlled by
the County Commissioner). Id. Moreover, the black community showed very little
interest in the referendum, as attested at trial by City Councilman Willie Basby, a black
councilman elected from the county seat's majority black council district. Id. at 6 n.3.
23. Mr. Holder has been the county commissioner since 1976, and is one of only seven
county commissioners in Bleckley County's history. Brief for the Petitioners at 4, Holder
(No. 91-2012). No minority has ever run for or been elected to the office, and the district
judge stated that, having run for public office himself, he "wouldn't run if [he] were black
in Bleckley County." Holder v. Hall, 955 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 2581 (1994).
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dent of elections.24 The complaint raised both a constitutional and
a statutory claim.'
In their constitutional claim, the "respondents alleged that the
county's single-member commission was enacted or maintained with
an intent to exclude or limit the political influence of the county's
black community in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments."' The district court rejected that claim, holding that
the respondents had "failed to provide any evidence that Bleckley
County's single member county commission [was] the product of
original or continued racial animus or discriminatory intent.
27
The statutory claim asserted that the county's single-member
commission diluted minority voting strength,' violating section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 19 65 .2" According to the respondents, the
Act required Bleckley County to have a county commission of
sufficient size that the county's black citizens would constitute a
majority in a single-member election district.3" The district court
rejected this claim as well, finding that the respondents had failed to
satisfy two of three of the preconditions to a section 2 claim.3 The
24. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2584.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see Holder v. Hall, 757 F. Supp. 1560, 1569 (M.D. Ga. 1991), rev'd, 955 F.2d
1563 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994). The plaintiff must show intent to
discriminate to establish a Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment claim. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed
to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose."). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 816-46 (4th ed. 1991) (providing an overview of voting rights under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, the development of voting rights jurisprudence, and factors
to be considered in assessing a discrimination claim under the Constitution).
27. Holder, 757 F. Supp. at 1571. The district court also found that the system was not
maintained for "tenuous reasons" and that the commissioner himself was not unresponsive
to the "particularized needs" of the black community. Id. at 1564. There was no "slating
process" to stand as a barrier to black candidates, and there was testimony from
respondents that they were unaware of any racial appeals in recent elections. Id. at 1562
n.2; see infra note 77 (listing the factors a district court should consider in assessing a
dilution claim).
28. Holder, 114 S.;Ct. at 2584.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
30. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2584-85.
31. Holder, 757 F. Supp. at 1582. The three necessary preconditions, as set out by the
Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986), are geographical compactness
of the minority group, minority political cohesion, and the existence of racial bloc voting
on the majority's part. See id.; infra note 89 and accompanying text. While finding the
first precondition satisfied, the court held that respondents failed to prove the existence
of racially polarized voting, embodied in the other two preconditions, which had been




Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the statutory
claim, holding that all of the preconditions were met, and that the
"totality of the circumstances" supported a finding of liability under
section 2.32 The court of appeals then remanded for formulation of
a remedy for the violation33 and suggested that it "could well be
modeled" after the five-member system used to elect the Bleckley
County school board?4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the statutory
holding of the court of appeals. 5 Justice Kennedy announced the
judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality opinion.36 Narrowly
holding that no objective alternative benchmark existed by which to
measure the dilutive effects of Bleckley County's single-member
commission system on the minority vote, a five-member group of
Justices37 reversed the court of appeals and remanded for con-
sideration of the respondents' constitutional claim of intentional
discrimination under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.3
A different five-member group, 9 however, found that section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act was meant to provide at least threshold
coverage4 of dilution claims against a governing authority's size.41
32. Holder v. Hall, 955 F.2d 1563, 1573-74 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2581
(1994). The court of appeals did not consider the district court's ruling on the respon-
dents' constitutional claim due to its statutory ruling and reversal. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at
2585.
33. ld at 1574.
34. Id. at 1574 n.20. In a referendum similar to the one rejected in 1986, Bleckley
County voters approved a five-member district plan for the election of the county school
board. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2585.
35. Holder v. Hall, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993). The Court did not consider the
constitutional claim because the Eleventh Circuit had reversed solely on statutory grounds.
Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2585.
36. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2583.
37. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the opinion of Justice Kennedy. Id. Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id at 2588
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas, joined
by Justice Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 2591 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
38. Id. at 2588.
39. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also filed a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens filed a separate
opinion in which Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2625 (Stevens,
J.). Justice O'Connor agreed with the part of that opinion which found that § 2 covers a
governing body's size. Id. at 2588 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
40. The phrase "threshold coverage" as used in this Note means only that the Act's
scope, both in letter and spirit, was intended to regulate the situation in question. The
1995] 1953
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The evolution of American voting rights jurisprudence has been
anything but smooth, and the minority citizen has often suffered as a
result.4" That evolution did occur, however, grudgingly and
sometimes violently. African-Americans first were enfranchised
during Reconstruction, a right that became constitutionally protected
upon the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.43 Shortly
thereafter, partly as a result of a rise in Southern white supremacist
movements, African-Americans were almost totally disenfranchised
once more.' Gradual reenfranchisement through Supreme Court
coverage is only "threshold" coverage due to the infeasibility of applying the Act to size
challenges. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion discusses this dichotomy, demonstrating
how a challenge may be "covered" by the threshold scope of § 2, yet not fit within the
established standards for demonstrating the existence of vote dilution. Holder, 114 S. Ct.
at 2589-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
41. Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote for each group, finding that challenges
to size were covered under § 2, but that no objective, alternative benchmark could ever
exist for the dilution comparison. Id. Consequently, although Justice O'Connor would
allow the federal courts threshold coverage of a dilution challenge to size under § 2, that
coverage is for all intents and purposes rendered inoperative by her belief that no
benchmark could ever be found for measurement. See infra note 104 and accompanying
text.
42. See Robert S. McKay, Racial Discrimination in the Electoral Process, in 6 RACE,
LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE RIGHT TO
VOTE 342, 342-58 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992) (examining that evolution up to 1973 and
asserting that "a measure of our [America's] own imperfection is the fact that it should
have taken so long in the United States to bring practice into line with aspiration, a task
still not completely accomplished").
43. See 6 RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 42, at viii (introduction)
(providing a brief description of the plight of African-Americans in their quest for
enfranchisement). After the Compromise of 1877 officially ended Reconstruction, the
newly acquired voting rights of blacks were squelched by whatever means available,
including violence, intimidation, and fraud. Id. at viii-ix ("As one Mississippi Democratic
politician asserted in 1875, 'Carry the election peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must.' ").
Ultimately the disenfranchisement was accomplished not by physical violence and
intimidation, but by law, in the form of amendments to state constitutions, poll taxes,
literacy tests, grandfather clauses, property requirements, and other mechanisms that
prevented blacks from exercising their right to vote. Id. at ix. Since these laws never
mentioned race, the Supreme Court of the period was unwilling to strike them down as
violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.
44. Id. at viii-ix.
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decisions beginning in 1915,' s however, made the African-American
citizen's right to vote a practical reality by the 1960s.'
Even though the Court invalidated all-white primaries and other
facially discriminatory tactics throughout the first half of this century,
and expanded its reading of the Fifteenth Amendment to invalidate
racial gerrymandering schemes in 1960,4' the voting rights of
minority citizens continued to be denied in many states. Legislation
did little to stem the tide of discrimination, and case-by-case litigation
efforts proved cumbersome and ineffective.48 The report of the
House Judiciary Committee considering the then Voting Rights Bill
of 1965 noted that "[t]he historic struggle for the realization of this
45. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). In Guinn, the Court struck down
Oklahoma's "grandfather clause," which allowed poor and illiterate whites to vote because
their grandfathers had been voters before 1866, but did not grant the same privilege to
blacks. Id. at 352-53; see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (holding that
privately run all-white primaries which prohibited African-Americans from voting
constituted state action and violated the Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 663-66 (1944) (invalidating the whites-only Democratic primary in Alabama).
46. See 6 RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 42, at ix. During this
evolution, the Supreme Court proceeded slowly in invalidating discriminatory legislation.
See Emma C. Jordan, The Future of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 How. L.J. 541, 555
(1985) (arguing that the Court acquiesced in all but the most "obvious and crude acts of
discrimination," such as statutes which facially prevented blacks from voting). The origins
of this acquiescence can be traced back to United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,217 (1875),
where the Court stated that "[t]he Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of
suffrage upon any one."
47. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,347 (1960). In Gomillion, the Court held that
a local act altering the shape of Tuskegee, Alabama, from a square to an "uncouth" 28-
sided figure, which effectively removed all but four or five of its 400 African-American
voters while leaving the white constituency intact, constituted sufficient evidence to state
a valid voting rights discrimination claim. Id. at 341, 347. See generally MARK E. RUSH,
DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? PARTISAN REPRESENTATION AND
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR (1993) (examining the gerrymander in great depth); Ripley Eagles
Rand, Note, The Fancied Line Shaw v. Reno and the Chimerical Racial Gerrymander, 72
N.C. L. REV. 725 (1994) (discussing the history behind, and current status of, the racial
gerrymander in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816
(1993)).
48. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,313-14 (1966) (finding that voting
rights suits were arduous to prepare, lent themselves to official delays, and were usually
ineffective even when successful, as some states simply switched to other devices not
specifically covered by federal decrees or enacted difficult new tests to prolong voting
disparity). See generally 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS
935-38 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970) (editorial commentary) (discussing the legislative
history of the 1960 Civil Rights Act that made the Act ineffective and "primarily
symbolic").
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[Fifteenth Amendment] guarantee indicates clearly that our national
achievements in this area have fallen far short of our aspirations."
49
In response to this national crisis, Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act of 196550 to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in
voting."51 Hailed by President Lyndon B. Johnson as a "triumph for
freedom as huge as any ever won on any battlefield," 2 the Act was
directed at the methods and tactics used to disqualify blacks from
registering and voting in federal and state elections, emphasizing
equal electoral access by facilitating registration and securing the
ballot 3 The Act was designed to work on two levels. First, in
section 2, it flatly prohibited discriminatory practices and
procedures.5 4 Next, it subjected certain "covered" states-states that
had a history of past discrimination in voting55-- to a "preclearance"
requirement, which mandated that any change in voting policy,
practice, or procedure be pre-approved by either the Attorney
General or the federal district court for the District of Columbia 6
The Act was to last for only five years, as a "quick-fix" remedy. 7
However, it was reenacted in both 1970 and 1975 due to its inability
49. H.R. Doc. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2437, 2439.
50. Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973
to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
51. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
52. S. REP. No. 417,97th Cong., 2d sess. 4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
181 (1982).
53. Id. at 118, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 290.
54. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988)).
To enforce this prohibition, the Attorney General was authorized to send in federal
examiners either to register voters or to monitor the conduct of elections. Id. § 6 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(d) (1988)); S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 5, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 182.
55. "Covered" jurisdictions were those that had a literacy test or similar device to
screen votes as of November 1, 1964, 1968, or 1972, and low voter registration turnout of
fewer than 50% of eligible citizens registered as of the same dates. S. REP. No. 417, supra
note 52, at 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 182; see also Robert Barnes, Comment,
Vote Dilution, Discriminatory Results, and Proportional Representation: What Is The
Appropriate Remedy For A Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 1203, 1210-11 n.26 (1985) (discussing the coverage "triggering formula").
56. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)).
The preclearance requirement was meant to ensure that the old devices would not simply
be replaced with newer, more subtle practices. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 6,
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 182. It was also meant to provide an expeditious and
effective review to ensure that devices other than those directly addressed in the Act, e.g.,
literacy tests and poll taxes, would not be used to "thwart the will" of Congress to secure
the franchise for blacks. Id.
57. Cf. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 5-8, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 181-
1956 [Vol. 73
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to cure the problem immediately, and amended in 1982 to incorporate
a discriminatory results test for electoral practices.
5 8
Following the dramatic rise in minority voter registration after
passage of the Act, a broad array of subtler dilution schemes replaced
the outlawed blatant practices and acted to cancel the impact of the
new minority vote. 9 Consequently, from 1965 until the 1982
amendments, section 5 was the focal point of statutory vote dilution,
because it required federal pre-approval of new practices;' however,
section 5 applies only when a covered jurisdiction proposes a change
in voting procedure.6' Existing discriminatory voting systems were
attacked solely on constitutional grounds, as violations of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.62 The early development of
constitutional vote dilution jurisprudence focused on mathematical
population differences between legislative districts.63 Later cases
58. See id. at 7-12,27-30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 184-89,204-08. The results
test differentiated the Act from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which require
a showing of discriminatory intent for a violation. See infra notes 65-81 and accompanying
text.
59. See S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 183.
The schemes included, inter alia, switching from elective to appointive governmental
offices; gerrymandering election boundaries; instituting majority runoff requirements to
prevent victories in prior plurality systems; and substituting at-large elections for election
by single-member districts. Id. In the words of the Senate Judiciary Committee: "The
ingenuity of such schemes seems endless. Their common purpose and effect has been to
offset the gains made at the ballot box under the Act." Id
60. Cf. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History in CONTROVR-
SIES, supra note 3, at 7,17-37 (focusing on § 5 as the primary statutory protection of voting
rights before the 1982 amendment of § 2).
61. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2587 ("Section 5 applies only in certain jurisdictions specified
by Congress and 'only to proposed changes in voting procedures.' ") (quoting Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130, 138 (1976)).
62. Before City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and the subsequent
amendment of the Act, courts assumed that § 2 was "essentially ... synonymous with the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments." Barnes, supra note 55, at 1221. Consequently,
vote dilution claims to existing systems were not brought under the Act, but under the
established constitutional line of cases. Id.; see also Davidson, supra note 60, at 38
("Section 2 ... had served as little more than a symbolic preamble to the operative
sections [of the Act], in effect restating the Fifteenth Amendment.").
63. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 568 (1964) (raising the concept of "one-
man, one-vote" to the level of a fundamental right, and holding that significant
mathematical disparities among districts can unconstitutionally abridge the right to vote);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962) (using the Equal Protection Clause to provide
a standard for fashioning judicial relief, thereby making reapportionment cases justiciable);
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 856 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)
(establishing the "one-man-one-vote" concept). These early cases, which focused on
"quantitative" vote dilution, were termed "first generation" voting rights cases by one
renowned commentator-Lani Guinier. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY 7 (1994).
1995] 1957
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expanded the concept to address the potential dilutive effects of
electoral schemes such as multi-member districts and at-large
elections. 4
When Congress amended the Act in 1982,65 it incorporated a
group of factors set forth in two 1973 vote dilution decisions, one by
the Supreme Court and the other by the Fifth Circuit.66 The two
decisions outlined the evidentiary standards to be met in establishing
a constitutional dilution claim. In White v. Regester, the Supreme
Court invalidated multi-member districts in two Texas counties
because in their operation they diluted the voting strength of racial
and ethnic minorities.67 Making clear that such schemes were not
per se unconstitutional, the Court asserted that the focus should be on
the actual result of the legislation "[b]ased on the totality of the cir-
cumstances." '  Zimmer v. McKeithen69 involved a challenge by
black residents of East Carroll Parish, Louisiana to a proposed at-
large scheme' for election of the school board and police juries.
64. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 157-60 (1971) (recognizing that multi-
member districts can operate to minimize or cancel the impact of minority votes, and
requiring an evidentiary showing that the electoral system denied equal access to the
political process); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (stating that a constitutional
violation could be shown by proof of an "invidious effect" or an "invidious result");
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) ("It might well be, that designedly or
otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances
of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or political elements of the voting population."). Professor Guinier dubbed this type of
case "second generation" voting rights activism, which focused on "qualitative" vote
dilution. GUINIER, supra note 63, at 7.
65. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 77 for a list of the incorporated factors.
67. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). In White, African- and Mexican-American residents of Dallas
and Bexar Counties, Texas challenged parts of a legislative reapportionment plan adopted
by the State of Texas. Plaintiffs alleged that the multimember districts for the two
counties in which they resided minimized the effect of their votes in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Ia. at 759. The Court specifically relied upon evidence of a long
history of official discrimination against minorities, indifference to their concerns on the
part of white elected officials, exclusion from the Democratic Party's slate, and cultural
and language barriers for the Mexican-American plaintiffs which made "participation in
[the] community processes extremely difficult." Id. at 766-68.
68. Id. at 768.
69. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East
Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam).
70. Under an at-large system, voters cast ballots for all contested seats in the
governing authority, rather than for a single district representative. Consequently, the
voting power of any particular area is submerged in the voting power of the entire area,
increasing the likelihood that the majority will prevail. This is especially true where
racially polarized voting is prevalent. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982)
("At-large voting schemes and multi-member districts tend to minimize the voting strength
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The parish argued that, because blacks constituted a majority of the
parish's total population, no dilution claim could lie.7 The Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument, stating that "although population is the
proper measure of equality in apportionment, . . . access to the
political process and not population [is] the barometer of dilution of
minority voting strength."'72
In 1980, the Supreme Court abandoned the results-oriented
approach of White and Zimmer in its controversial City of Mobile v.
Bolden73 decision. In Bolden, a plurality of the Court held that
proof of a discriminatory purpose was necessary to establish a
constitutional vote dilution claim against "racially neutral" state
action.74 When the seven-year extension of the Voting Rights Act
expired in 1982, Congress was presented with the ideal opportunity to
reverse Bolden, which had been roundly condemned in the academic
press.75 Congress amended section 2 of the Act to incorporate the
pre-Bolden "results" language of White and Zimmer.76 In its 1982
report, the Senate Judiciary Committee listed what it considered the
of minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all representatives of the
district."); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 158-59 (1971) (noting "winner-take-all"
aspects of multi-member districts and a tendency to submerge minorities and overrepresent
the winning party); see also GUINIER, supra note 63, at 3-7 (arguing that "winner-take-all"
majority at-large elections allow as little as 51% of the population to decide 100% of the
elections).
71. Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1303.
72. 1d. (emphasis added).
73. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
74. Id. at 62. Due to its assumed synonymity with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, § 2 provided no relief here either. See supra note 62.
75. See, ag., Katharine I. Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Election
Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REv. 851, 853 (1982)
(arguing that Bolden did not give "proper consideration to the role the right to vote plays
in a democratic society," and therefore reached the wrong result); Aviam Soifer,
Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 383, 409 (1981) ("To settle for the
constitutionalization of the status quo is to bequeath a petrified forest. It is to fail to do
justice in the constitutional quest."); Terry Gorman, Note, City of Mobile v. Bolden: Voter
Dilution and New Intent Requirements Under the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
18 HoUs. L. REV. 611, 611 (1981) ("By limiting fifteenth amendment protection in racial
voting matters and requiring extremely stringent evidentiary standards for equal protection
challenges, the Bolden Court may have ended successful challenges to unconstitutional
vote dilution.").
76. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated,
Section 2, as amended, adopts the functional view of 'political process' used in
White rather than the formalistic view espoused by the plurality in Mobile....
[T]his section without question is aimed at discrimination which takes the form
of dilution, as well as outright denial of the right to register or to vote.
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 30 n.120, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208.
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most relevant of the "White-Zimmer" factors." The factors are to
be employed by a court in applying White's "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test,78 and clearly indicate that a discriminatory legis-
lative purpose is not necessary to establish a vote dilution claim-only
the effects of the contested scheme or mechanism need be dilutive.
Congress also added section 2(b), which codified the results test79
77. The list includes:
1. [The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group
to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or
other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected
to public office in the jurisdiction.
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07
(footnotes omitted). The Committee also indicated two additional factors that in some
cases may have probative value in establishing a violation: (1) "whether there is a
significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs
of the members of the minority group," and (2) "whether the policy underlying the
political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure is tenuous." Id at 219, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207
(footnotes omitted).
78. Id at 21-23, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 199-200. The Committee
emphasized that there is no "scorekeeping" approach to the use of the factors--that is, no
set number of them must be shown to establish a vote dilution claim. In its words, "[t]he
cases demonstrate, and the Committee intends that there is no requirement that any
particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or
another." Id. at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07.
79. See supra note 4 for the text of amended § 2.
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and included the so-called "Dole Compromise,, 80  an express
disclaimer of any right to proportional representation.81
The conflict between the revamped results test and the Dole
Compromise's rejection of proportional representation presented an
"inherent tension,"' ' as courts were asked to improve minority access
to political participation while simultaneously avoiding propor-
tionality. Hence, in the years following the amendment, courts had
difficulty applying the new section to vote dilution claims. Much of
the controversy centered around the importance of racially polarized
voting to dilution claims,8 and the statistical methods to be used to
determine its existence.'I
In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court for the first time
addressed the effect of the 1982 amendments on vote dilution claims,
and attempted to provide a workable test for proving section 2
80. The new section was named for Sen. Robert Dole, a Republican from Kansas.
The prohibition against guaranteed proportionality was apparently inserted to "mollify"
conservatives who had taken seriously Justice Stewart's Bolden dictum concerning the
dangers of allowing results to govern vote dilution claims. Jim R. Karpiak, Voting Rights
and the Role of the Federal Government" The Rehnquist Court's Mixed Messages In
Minority Vote Dilution Cases, 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 627, 636 n.65 (1993). Justice Stewart did
not believe that political groups, as opposed to individuals, had an independent
constitutional right to representation. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 78-79
(1980); see also infra note 197. According to Justice Stewart, using results to measure
discrimination would lead to proportional representation, which is not required by the
Equal Protection Clause as an "imperative of political organization." Bolden, 446 U.S. at
75-76; see infra note 197.
81. The disclaimer states: "Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population." Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b), 96 Stat.
131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988)).
82. See Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 84 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
83. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364,384-85 (5th Cir.) (indicating that
no specific number of Senate factors must be proven to establish a § 2 violation, and
stressing the importance of racially polarized voting), reh'g denied, 730 F.2d 233 (1984);
United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (11th Cir.) (holding that
racially polarized voting "will ordinarily be the keystone of a vote dilution case"), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984).
84. See Collins v. City of Norfolk, 768 F.2d 572,574-76 (4th Cir. 1985) (condoning the
use of multi-variate statistical analysis), cert. granted and vacated, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lee
County Branch of NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1482 (11th Cir. 1984)
(remanding with instructions to the district court to use a multi-variate statistical analysis,
which measures the relative effect of a number of factors in addition to the race of the
voter on electoral outcomes, to determine the effects of racially polarized voting). See
generally Jones, 730 F.2d at 233-35 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring in denial of
petition for rehearing) (discussing the statistical and evidentiary standards for racially
polarized voting).
85. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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violations. Gingles involved a challenge to a North Carolina
legislative redistricting plan that created certain multi-member districts
with significant, although not majority, African-American
populations. 6 The plaintiffs proposed to establish smaller single-
member districts, some of which would have majorities of African-
American voters.' A fractured Court affirmed the district court's
holding that the "totality of the circumstances" supported a finding
that the current scheme was diluting the minority group's voting
strength."8 Led by Justice Brennan, the Court took a "functional
view" of the political process and established three preconditions to
a vote dilution claim: (1) the minority population must be "suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact" to constitute a majority in
a single-member district; (2) minority voters must be "politically
cohesive"; and (3) the white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc
that it usually defeats minority-preferred candidates. 9 Before
reaching the "totality of the circumstances" test, a court must first find
that those preconditions are met.9°
The Court noted that the "right question" in voting rights cases
is "whether, 'as a result of the challenged practice or structure,
plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the
86. Id. at 35, 38.
87. Id. at 46 n.12.
88. Id. at 80. The district court found that racially polarized voting, a legacy of official
discrimination in voting, education, housing, employment, and health services, and
persistent racial appeals in campaigning.joined with the multi-member districting scheme
to hinder black voters' ability to participate equally in the electoral process. Id.
89. Id. at 50-51. The Court took these preconditions from S. REP. No. 417, supra note
52, at 16-33, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 193-211. The Report, while espousing a
flexible, fact-intensive test for § 2 violations, limits § 2 claims in three ways. First, electoral
devices such as at-large elections are not considered per se violations of § 2-plaintiffs
must demonstrate, under the totality of the circumstances, that they result in unequal
access to the political process. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 193. Also, the
combination of an allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism and lack of proportional
representation alone does not establish a violation. Id. Finally, the results test does not
assume the existence of racial bloc voting-plaintiffs must prove it. Id. at 34, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 212.
90. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 49-50. As later observed by the Seventh Circuit in McNeil v.
Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989),
these preconditions circumscribe the almost unbridled judicial discretion that otherwise
might exist under the totality of the circumstances test, and limit the inquiry to those
claims that meet the threshold requirements. It has been noted that the Gingles "electoral
standard" (the first prong-geographic compactness) makes raising an "ability to
influence" claim more difficult, and hence makes establishing a § 2 claim harder. Kathryn
Abrams, Raising Politics Up: Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 465 (1988).
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political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.' 91 The
Gingles Court, therefore, required a plaintiff group to prove that the
challenged election practice caused the alleged injury.92 It also
synthesized the prior statistically involved methods of determining
bloc voting into a "common sense" notion of racially polarized voting
as merely reflecting differences in the voting behavior of groups.93
Since Gingles, the federal courts have confronted a number of
vote dilution claims encompassing a wide variety of factual patterns,
but the standards for deciding them have remained unclear.94 Until
91. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 (quoting S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 28, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206) (emphasis added).
92. One commentator noted that "It]his insistence on establishing a causal relationship
between the challenged election system or practice and the alleged vote dilution is a
critical element of any reasoned analysis." C. Robert Heath, Managing The Political
Thicket: Developing Objective Standards In Voting Rights Litigation, 21 STETSON L. REV.
819, 821 (1992).
93. Bernard Grofman, The Use of Ecological Regression to Estimate Racial Bloc
Voting, 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 593, 597 (1993). The Gingles Court found that voting is racially
polarized where there is "a consistent relationship between the race of the voter and the
way in which the voter votes, or to put it differently, where black voters and white voters
vote differently." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21 (adopting Dr. Bernard Grofman's definition,
as put forth at trial); see League of United Latin Amer. Citizens Council No. 4434 v.
Clements, 986 F.2d 728, 748 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that racially polarized voting is an
objective factor which is established by evidence demonstrating that voters vote along
racial lines), on reh'g, 999 F.2d 831, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994); Clark v. Calhoun
County, 813 F. Supp. 1189,1198 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (using the Gingles conception of racially
polarized voting); see also Evelyn Elayne Shockley, Note, Voting Rights Act Section 2:
Racially Polarized Voting and the Minority Community's Representative of Choice, 89
MICH. L. REv. 1038, 1045-53 (1991) (discussing three approaches taken by lower courts
to the Gingles view of racial bloc voting- (1) cases finding the race of the candidate
irrelevant, (2) cases implicitly treating the candidate's race as a relevant factor in
evaluating the level of racial bloc voting; and (3) cases explicitly finding the candidate's
race relevant).
94. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2830-33 (1993) (using the aesthetically
"irrational" appearance of a proposed North Carolina legislative district as the basis for
an equal protection claim by white majority voters); Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075,
1083-85 (1993) (discussing voter fragmentation in single-member districts and concluding
that the Gingles preconditions were "unattainable" under the case's facts); Presley v.
Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 506 (1992) (holding that shifts in the allocation of
power in a government body were not subject to § 5 preclearance because they had "no
direct relation to, or impact on, voting"); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991)
(finding judicial elections subject to § 2 dilution analysis); Carrollton Branch of NAACP
v. Stallings, 829 F. 2d 1547, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987) (reconsidering decision of district court
in light of Gingles), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988); Cane v. Worcester County, 840 F.
Supp. 1081, 1091 (D. Md. 1994) (recommending that the county consider alternative
solutions-solutions other than single-member districting-as the remedy for its dilution
violation); Shockley, supra note 93, at 1067 ("Over four years after Thornburg v. Gingles
was handed down, the case law under section 2 . . . is still in disarray. . . . [T]he
Court.. .further confused lower courts by introducing controversy over the way to
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Holder, the Supreme Court had never directly addressed a dilution
challenge to a governing body's existing size under section 2."
However, previous lower court cases rejected the notion that a
proposed system with an expanded size may serve as the benchmark
by which to measure the dilutive effects of an existing electoral
structure, such as a multi-member, at-large district.96 In McNeil v.
Springfield Park District, the Seventh Circuit refused to expand the
size of a county commission from seven to the eight or nine necessary
to permit the plaintiff's racial group to constitute a majority in a
single-member district. 7 The court carefully distinguished between
a court's broad remedial powers to order such relief, and the
probative purpose of the Gingles threshold geographical compactness
test, which is to determine whether there is a causal relationship
between the use of an at-large system and the alleged dilution of
minority voting strength.98 In essence, the court decided that the
determine the existence of racially polarized voting.").
95. It is interesting to note that the Eleventh Circuit addressed this type of challenge
in 1987, and decided that it was appropriate to consider demographic evidence relating to
the geographic concentration of voters in hypothetical three- and five-member forms of
commission government. Carrollton, 829 F. 2d at 1563. In other words, the Carrollton
court would allow plaintiffs to use a hypothetical expanded commission size to determine
the dilutive effects of a system in which a single commissioner is elected at-large.
Carrollton differed slightly from Holder in that the commission size had intentionally been
reduced in the past from 5 to 3 to 1 in order to limit black voting strength, but
nevertheless is implicitly overruled by Holder's rationale.
96. E.g., Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529,543 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Actionable vote
dilution must be measured against the number of positions in the existing governmental
body rather than some hypothetical model based on whatever size is necessary to
accomplish proportional representation.") (Jones, J., concurring in the judgment); cf.
McNeil v. City of Springfield, Ill., 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (C.D. Ill.) (memorandum
opinion) (assuming an expanded council size for the dilution comparison, but only because
a state law required cities with ward systems to have a council of either 10 or 20 members,
and Springfield had a city commission of only five members), appeal dismissed sub nom.
In re City of Springfield, Ill., 818 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1987).
97. McNeil, 851 F.2d 937, 946 (7th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989).
98. Id. The McNeil court noted, "Although courts have broad remedial powers,
plaintiffs must first show injustice [before a remedy may be had]." lId
Some lower courts, in line with McNeil's reasoning, have forced expansion of a
governing body's size in the remedy stage of some dilution cases to permit the inclusion
of minorities. See, e.g., Carrollton, 829 F.2d at 1563 (holding that it is appropriate to
consider geographical compactness of minoritygroups in expanded three- and five-member
commission sizes in determining the remedy for alleged dilutive effects of at-large election
of single commissioner); Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870,871-72
(M.D. Ala. 1988) (increasing the size of several municipal governing bodies to provide a
realistic opportunity for cumulative voting remedy to result in minority inclusion), aff'd,
868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989); McNeil, 658 F. Supp. at 1022 (assuming a 10-member
council as the relevant measuring stick for determining a remedy).
1964 [Vol. 73
VOTE DILUTION
purpose of the Gingles test is to help determine whether a violation
exists, not to create one by increasing the size of the governing body
being challenged.99 In other words, according to the Seventh Circuit,
dilution cannot be proved by comparing an existing structure to
another with an expanded size, but may be remedied by expanding the
structure's size once dilution has been proved by some other means.
In Holder, the Court faced once again the problem inherent in all
section 2 vote dilution claims-how courts should identify vote
dilution, measure its effects, and decide whether section 2 has been
violated. While Holder appears on its face to address only the narrow
issue of whether section 2 covers vote dilution claims based on a
governing body's size, it essentially involves a continuation of the
long-standing debate over quantifying the fights of minority voters.
The Court's divergent lines of reasoning and lack of a strong
consensus on the Act's requirements and on the proper role of the
federal courts in this sensitive area reflect the simple fact that
measuring the effectiveness of political participation is a difficult
task."°°  While not establishing any new evidentiary standards for
99. McNeil, 851 F.2d at 946. The McNeil court noted, "Adding seats to the boards
would create a voting rights violation where none presently exists by enabling appellants
to meet the necessary precondition of their Section 2 claim. This is a sort of bootstrapping
we cannot accept." Id.; see Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1425 n.10 (9th Cir.
1989) ("If proposed districting plans with additional district seats could be considered to
prove a section 2 violation, there would be no case where geographical compactness could
not be demonstrated by artful gerrymandering."), affg 665 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
see also Heath, supra note 92, at 827 (1992) ("While there may be legitimate and
compelling reasons for expanding the size of a legislative body, once one departs from the
current number of districts or other objective standard, the test loses its validity as a
threshold standard."). Compare Carrollton, 829 F.2d at 1563 (holding that demographic
evidence of voter concentration in proposed expanded commission sizes was "highly
relevant" to a showing under Gingles), with McNeil, 851 F.2d at 946 (distinguishing
Carrollton by the fact that it involved past intentional dilution of the minority community's
vote).
100. A recap of the division among Justices is helpful here. Justice Kennedy, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded both that no reasonable benchmark existed and that
§ 2 did not cover size challenges. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. Justice
O'Connor concurred in their judgment and in their benchmark reasoning, but found that
§ 2 did provide threshold coverage of size challenges. See supra notes 37, 39-41 and
accompanying text. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in their judgment
also, but would further limit § 2 to disallow claims based on anything but denial of access
to the ballot. See supra note 37. Those five constituted the plurality on the benchmark
holding.
Justice O'Connor's interpretation of § 2 to cover size challenges allied her with the
reasoning of the dissenters, Justices Blackmun, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter. See supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text. Hence, a separate five-member majority found that
§ 2 should be interpreted to cover vote dilution challenges to size.
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vote dilution claims, or even directly addressing the theoretical bases
of political participation, Holder does rein in vote dilution claims by
precluding future inquiry into the dilutive effects of governmental size
and limiting the role of the federal courts in policing state voting
practices. Holder may be divided into two main segments for
purposes of simplicity: (1) interpretation of section 2; and (2) the
search for a benchmark by which to measure dilution in size challen-
ges.
Before reaching the benchmark dilemma, the Court had to decide
whether a governing body's size could be considered a "standard,
practice, or procedure" under section 2. If not, no claim under the
Act would lie. Since section 5 does encompass size claims,"1 much
of the case focused on the perceived similarity between sections 2 and
5. Statutory construction, historical precedent, and legislative history
were used to stress either that the two sections were never meant to
be the same"~ or that both sections were meant to be read broadly
to prohibit vote dilution of all kinds."° In the end, five justices
found that dilution claims based on size were covered under section
2, due to its similarity in language and purpose to section 5. That
finding did not expand minority voting rights at all, however, due to
the equally binding holding that no reasonable benchmark can ever
exist to measure dilution in a challenge to size. In essence, five
members of the Court gave minority voters their cake, but a different
five would not let them eat it. Justice O'Connor provided the swing
vote for both sides, as she simultaneously handed minority voters the
plate while binding their mouths."°
Section 5 of the Act prohibits changes in voting policy by
"covered" states with regard to "[a]ny voting qualification or
101. See infra note 107.
102. See Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2586-88 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (arguing that "[a]
voting practice is not necessarily subject to a dilution challenge under § 2 even when a
change in that voting practice would be subject to the preclearance requirements of § 5");
id. at 2591-619 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (stressing vehemently that § 2 was
never meant to apply to vote dilution claims at all).
103. See id. at 2625-30 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (arguing that a distinction between §
2 and § 5 is difficult to square with the language of the statute); id. at 2619-24 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
104. Justice O'Connor voiced concern over the far-reaching implications of the
respondents' suggested rationale: "Once a court accepts respondents' reasoning, it will
have to allow a plaintiff group insufficiently large or geographically compact to form a
majority in one of five districts to argue that the jurisdiction's failure to establish a 10-, 15-,
or 25-member commissioner structure is dilutive." Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2590 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect
to voting." Section 2 prohibits any discriminatory "voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure." The Court read section 5 broadly in Allen v. State Board
of Elections,"s attaching great significance to the fact that "Congress
chose not to include even.., minor exceptions in § 5, thus indicating
an intention that all changes, no matter how small, be subject to § 5
scrutiny."'1"6 Since Allen, section 5 has been extended to cover
challenges to changes in governmental size," annexations of
land,"°3 and switches from elective to appointive offices. 9  Unlike
its counterpart, section 2 was hardly used until its amendment in 1982;
prior to that it was considered co-extensive with the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.110 In the ensuing twelve years, however,
section 2 took over the vote dilution spotlight, as litigants used its
revamped results test to attack existing discriminatory electoral
systems, structures, or practices."'
On this issue, the Holder Court divided three ways: (1) those
who found the two sections co-extensive, at least for threshold
105. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
106. Id at 568 (emphasis added).
107. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1992) (stating
that a change in a governing authority's size is a "standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting" because the change "increase[s] or diminishes the number of officials
for whom the electorate may vote," thereby bearing "on the substance of voting power"
and having "a direct relation to voting and the election process"); Lockhart v. United
States, 460 U.S. 125, 131 (1983) (holding that a change from a three- to a five-member
commission was subject to § 5 preclearance); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
160-61 (noting that an expansion in the size of a board of education was clearly covered
in § 5), reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 916 (1980).
108. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 467 (1987) (holding that
annexations of both inhabited and uninhabited land are subject to § 5 preclearance).
109. See, e.g., McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 250 n.17 (1984) (noting that a change
from an appointed to an elected office affects a citizen's voting power and is therefore
subject to the § 5 preclearance requirement); Bunton v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544, 569-70
(1969) (holding that a change from an elected to an appointed office was a "standard,
practice, or procedure" with respect to voting).
110. See supra note 62.
111. Section 2 was even extended to cover judicial elections in Chisom v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380, 395-96 (1991), which interpreted "representative" to mean the winner of a
representative, popular election. ld. at 399. The Chisom Court reasoned that if Congress
had intended to exclude judicial elections from coverage, it would have made that intent
explicit in the statute or at least mentioned it somewhere in the legislative history of the
1982 amendments. Id. at 399-402; see also Houston Lawyer's Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of
Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1991) (holding that judicial elections must be conducted in
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and stating that "the term 'representatives' is not
a word of limitation"), rev'g 498 U.S. 1060 (1991).
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coverage;" 2 (2) those who found that section 2 does not cover size
challenges and is not co-extensive with section 5; and (3) those
who argued that section 2 was never meant to cover anything but
ballot access."'
Although Justice Thomas strenuously urged a "systematic
reassessment" of the Court's interpretation of section 2"-arguing
at length that the Act's terms, when interpreted according to
established canons of statutory construction, do not cover dilution
cases at all"6-it is clear that amended section 2 was meant to
encompass more than mere access to the ballot. The statute itself
refers to the openness of the "political process leading to nomination
or election" and the equal opportunity to participate in that process,
as well as the opportunity "to elect representatives of [one's] own
choice."' The legislative history is replete with references to
"political process.""' The two cases upon which Congress relied
most, White v. Regester"9 and Zimmer v. McKeithen,m  "were
concerned with activities both prior and subsequent to the actual
election.'1' In fact, the first of the "White-Zimmer" factors"
112. This group consisted of Justices O'Connor, Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2588-89, Souter,
Ginsburg, Stevens, and Blackmun, id at 2619-21.
113. This view was espoused by Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Id. at 2585-88.
114. Justice Thomas argued this view at length in his opinion concurring in the
judgment, and was joined by Justice Scalia. Id. at 2591-619 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment). In Chisom, Justice Scalia dissented on the narrow ground that "[s]ection 2
extends to vote dilution claims for the elections of representatives only, and judges are not
representatives." Chisom, 501 U.S. at 405 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). By
joining Justice Thomas in Holder, Justice Scalia repudiated this position that § 2 covered
at least some dilution claims and aligned himself with the extreme view that § 2 covers
only ballot access. See Holder, 114 S. Ct. 2591-619 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
115. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2591 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
116. Id. at 2603-11. Justice Thomas claimed that the language of the Act dictates that
the Court's "interpretation of § 5 should not be adopted wholesale to supply the meaning
of the terms 'standard, practice, or procedure' under § 2." Id. at 2611 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(similarly arguing the necessity of applying traditional statutory construction to section 2
interpretation).
117. See supra note 4 (providing the Act's full text).
118. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated, "The initial effort to implement the
Voting Rights Act focused on registration ... [b]ut registration is only the first hurdle to
full effective participation in the political process." S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 6,
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 183.
119. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
120. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd on other grounds sub nom. East
Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
121. Abrams, supra note 90, at 459.
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adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee directs courts to look at
"the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process."" The fifth looks at the extent to which
discrimination against members of the minority group "hinder[s] their
ability to participate effectively in the political process.''""A The very
existence of the Dole Compromise indicates that the section covers
more than mere access, since proportionality would not have been a
concern unless the amendments were directed at potentially dilutive
electoral schemes."z In other words, merely ensuring access to the
ballot would not engender worry over guaranteeing minorities a
proportional number of seats.'6
The Judiciary Committee relied upon Reynolds v. Sims as the
patriarch of the dilution principle, and quoted the Reynolds Court for
its description of the principle:
There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark
a piece of paper and drop it in a box or the right to pull
a lever in a voting booth. The right to vote includes the
right to have the ballot counted.... It also includes the
right to have the vote counted at full value without
dilution or discount. 27
The Committee continued in its own words:
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, discriminatory
election systems or practices which operate, designedly or
otherwise, to minimize or cancel out the voting strength and
political effectiveness of minority groups, are an impermis-
sible denial of the right to have one's vote fully count, just
as much as outright denial of access to the ballot box....
[S]ection 2 remains the major statutory prohibition of all
voting rights discrimination.... [T]he requirement that the
122. See supra note 77.
123. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205-07
(emphasis added).
124. ld (emphasis added).
125. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
126. Cf S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 140-47, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
313-20 (additional views of Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah) (objecting to the results test
as inevitably leading to proportionality and claiming that the disclaimer against guaranteed
proportionality will have no effect on the problem); see infra note 197.
127. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 19, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 196
(quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964)).
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political processes leading to nomination and election be
'equally open to participation by the group in question'
extefids beyond formal or official bars to registering and
voting, or to maintaining a candidacy."
It therefore appears that Justice Thomas's assertions about
"established canons of statutory construction" and an access-only
approach to the Act are not well founded. Short of amendment or
repeal, 29 section 2 must be read to cover vote dilution claims.
However, section 2's coverage of dilution claims in general does not
necessarily translate into its coverage of dilution claims against size.
Regardless of the similarity in language and purpose between sections
2 and 5, size challenges highlight a fundamental difference between
the two. Section 5 asks whether the proposed electoral change would
lead to "retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect
to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise"; 3' in other
words, the baseline for comparison under section 5 is the status
quo.131 Section 2 provides no such "inherent" benchmark, and
therefore does not easily lend itself to coverage of size challenges.
32
128. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 28-30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205-08
(emphasis added); see supra note 76 (noting the committee's adoption of a "functional
view" of the political process). The Court itself has explained that "there is no question
that the terms 'standard, practice, or procedure' are broad enough to encompass the use
of multimember districts to minimize a racial minority's ability to influence the outcome
of an election covered by section 2." Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,390 (1991). Even
the Chisom dissenters, while disagreeing that judges are representatives, agreed that § 2
extends to vote dilution claims. See supra note 114.
129. Cf Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2625 (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("To the extent that [Justice
Thomas's] opinion advances policy arguments in favor of [an access-only] interpretation
of the statute, it should be addressed to Congress, which has ample power to amend the
statute.").
130. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (emphasis added); see Holder, 114
S. Ct. at 2587 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (using the retrogression distinction to justify his
refusal to recognize § 2's coverage of size dilution claims).
131. See Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2587 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
132. Id. This lack of standards for comparison may actually be a problem with all vote
dilution claims under § 2, because divining the "correct" or optimal level of minority
voting strength against which to measure the existing system is an inherently political
matter. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 87-88 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (listing some of the inherent difficulties with the very concept of vote
"dilution"). Consequently, § 2 has been questioned as an unconstitutional delegation of
power to the judiciary. Interview with Melissa Saunders, Associate Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Feb. 8, 1995). However,
due to Congress's expansive Fifteenth Amendment powers, § 2's results test probably will
not be overturned on constitutional grounds. Id.; S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 39,
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 217 ("By now the breadth of Congressional power to
enforce these provisions is hombook law."). The Senate Judiciary Committee relied on
earlier Supreme Court precedent, noting that "Congress has full remedial powers to
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Nevertheless, according to Justice O'Connor, it is "[im]possible
to read the terms of § 2 more narrowly than the terms of § 5" as a
textual matter, at least for threshold coverage."3 Both sections have
the broad remedial purpose of eliminating discrimination in the
electoral process, and use nearly identical language to express that
purpose."' The mere fact that one lends itself more easily to proof
of discrimination in size challenges should not preclude the other from
initial coverage of those challenges. 3 Consequently, section 2 must
be read to encompass dilution challenges to existing governmental
size, in line with the Act's "broad remedial purpose of 'rid[ding] the
country of racial discrimination in voting.' i,36
Section 2's threshold coverage of size challenges was a mere
pyrrhic victory for the plaintiffs in this case, however, since five
members of the Court found no "objective alternative benchmark" by
which to measure the dilutive effects of governmental size.'37 To
determine whether minority voters have the potential to elect
representatives of their choice in the absence of a challenged electoral
structure, the Supreme Court requires an "objectively reasonable
alternative practice" against which to measure dilution. In some
effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting." S. REP.
NO. 417, supra note 52, at 39, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 217 (citing South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)). The Committee stated, "[T]he Court has long
held that Congress need not limit itself to legislation coextensive with the Fifteenth
Amendment, if there is a basis for the congressional determination that the legislation
furthers enforcement of the amendment." Id.
133. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2589 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
134. Cf id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (finding
that §§ 2 and 5 have parallel scope for purposes of determining threshold coverage).
135. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
136. ld. at 2619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,
403 (1991) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966))). The
Chisom Court stated: "Section 2 protected the right to vote, and it did so without making
any distinctions or imposing any limitations as to which elections would fall within its
purview." Chisom, 501 U.S. at 392.
137. See Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2589 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
138. Id. at 2589 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("In
order to decide whether an electoral system has made it harder for minority voters to elect
the candidates they prefer, a court must have an idea in mind of how hard it 'should' be
for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an acceptable system.");
Pamela S. Karlan, Maps & Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial
Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 176 (1989) ("Any theory of
qualitative vote dilution necessarily requires some notion of what the 'undiluted' voting
strength of the plaintiff class should be. In other words, courts must measure the observed
1995] 1971
1972 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
dilution contexts, this benchmark is "self-evident." '139 For example,
a court may compare a challenged multi-member at-large election
system to a system of multiple single-member districts."4 In juris-
dictions where majority vote requirements, numbered posts, staggered
terms, residency requirements, or anti-single-shot rules are used, 4'
the benchmark for comparison is simply a system without the
challenged practice. 42 According to the majority, however, section 2
dilution challenges to size are different because there are simply too
many choices to put any "objectively determinable constraints" on the
dilution inquiry."
results against some baseline of expected outcomes.").
139. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2589 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
140. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But cf id,
at 2594-97 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the choice of single-
member districts as the benchmark and the remedy in challenges to such schemes is only
one political judgment among many different possibilities); GUINIER, supra note 63, at 119-
56 (arguing that the current single-member districting remedy does not effectively provide
representation of either groups or individuals). See infra notes 159-89 and accompanying
text.
141. See generally City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 n.19 (1980)
(explaining the mechanics of single-shot voting and providing a hypothetical example).
Single-shot voting was often used by minority groups in multi-member districts where the
top vote-getters filled the available positions, each voter had as many votes to cast as there
were positions to be filled, and the candidates were all in competition with one another.
See id.; CONTROVERSIES, supra note 3, at 25 n.63. Minority groups would decide in
advance to support one candidate, and group members would cast only one of their
available votes for that candidate. Id. By withholding their other votes from that
candidate's competitors, minority groups could sometimes elect their chosen representative.
Id, So-called "full slate" laws, which invalidated all ballots on which the voter had not cast
all available votes, ended single-shot voting in the jurisdictions that employed them. Id.
Numbered post systems, staggered terms, and majority vote requirements similarly
eliminated the possibility of single-shooting to obtain representation. Id.
A majority requirement forces the two top vote-getters into a runoff election if neither
commanded a majority of votes in the first election. Id. at 23 n.56. This often allows
white majority voters, who have split their votes among several white candidates in the
first election, to coalesce behind a single white candidate, providing the required majority.
Id. In a numbered post system, candidates are required to run for designated places on
the ballot, with the majority vote-getter winning the post. Id. at 25 n.63. This quite
transparently leads to the exclusion of minority candidates in jurisdictions where racial bloc
voting exists, i.e., where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different
candidates. Id. Staggered terms are similar in their effect; each seat in the electorate
expires and is voted for at a different time of the year. Since single-shooting requires a
multi-member plurality election to work, staggered terms eliminate the possibility of its
use. See id.
142. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 2590 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
143. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
O'Connor argued that to accept the five-member commission here would lead to future
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Justice Thomas characterized the benchmark supporters in
Holder as focusing heavily on the "practical concern" that "there is no
principled method for determining a benchmark against which the size
of a governing body might be compared" to decide whether it dilutes
a minority group's voting strength.'" The respondents argued that
a five-member commission should be used for the comparison for
several reasons: it was a common form of governing authority in the
state;145 the state legislature had authorized the county to switch to
a five-member commission elected from single-member districts with
a chairman elected at-large;'" and the county had moved from a
single superintendent of education to a five-member school board
elected from single-member districts. 47 To the five benchmark
Justices, however, none of those considerations bore on dilution"
The Court held that the sole commissioner system has the same
impact on the vote whether or not it is common among other
counties, and a minority group's voting strength is not diluted any
more or less by the fact that the county enlarged its school board or
that the State authorized a change in size. 49 The choice of a
"hypothetical" larger commission as the benchmark, and the likely
remedy should dilution be found, was therefore "extremely
problematic" to the benchmark justices.'
claims from increasingly smaller minority groups arguing for larger commission sizes, so
that they would be able to form a geographically compact majority in one of the single-
member districts. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
see supra note 104.
144. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2591 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
O'Connor agreed, stating that "[tihe wide range of possibilities makes the choice
inherently standardless." Id. at 2590 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). This furthers the reasoning of lower court cases like McNeil v. Springfield
Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989). See supra notes
97-99 and accompanying text.
145. Of Georgia's 159 counties, 76 had five commissioners, including 25 counties smaller
than Bleckley County. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
GEORGIA DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, COUNTY GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
CATALOG (Table 1.A: Form of Government) (1989)).
146. I& (citing 1985 GA. LAWS 4406).
147. lit at 2586 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
148. Id. (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (describing the issues as "irrelevant considerations in
the dilution inquiry").
149. Id. (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("It makes little sense to say . . . that the sole
commissioner system should be subject to a dilution challenge if it is rare-but immune
if it is common."). This reasoning appears sound; if commonality were a bar to vote
dilution claims, multi-member, at-large electoral systems would never have been subject
to challenge on a dilution theory due to their widespread use.
150. Id. at 2590 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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The four dissenters on the benchmark reasoning did not see this
as a problem and would have relied on the Gingles "totality of the
circumstances" test to provide the limits on size claims that concerned
the Kennedy supporters.' By combining this "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test and the facts of each case with a "searching practical
evaluation of 'past and present reality,' 'I52 the dissenters believed
courts may responsibly decide whether a reasonable alternative
practice exists by which to determine dilution.53 Such an evaluation
did not present much difficulty in Holder because the five-member
commission was well grounded in history, custom, and practice, and
provided an immediately identifiable benchmark for the dilution
comparison.'T m
The Court has previously stated that there is no right to elect
particular representatives outside of a possible symbiotic relationship
with the right to equal participation in the political process, a
deprivation of which must be proven under the totality of the
circumstances to establish a section 2 violation.'55 In Holder, then,
the fact that no "minority-preferred" representative had ever been
elected to office in Bleckley County was not enough to establish a
vote dilution claim.'56 The plaintiffs also had to prove that they had
been denied equal participation in the political process, something
they could not do absent the use of a hypothetical, expanded
commission size for the dilution comparison. 57 Losing elections
151. Id. at 2622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text
(discussing the Gingles test).
152. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208
(quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973)).
153. Id. at 2622-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to Justice Blackmun, these
combined limitations "protect against a proliferation of vote-dilution challenges premised
on eccentric or impracticable alternative methods of redistricting." Id. at 2624 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
154. Id.; see supra note 145 (noting the prevalence of 5-member county commissions).
According to Justice Blackmun, this consideration would rule out size challenges to
traditional single-member executive offices such as governor, sheriff, and mayor. Holder,
114 S. Ct. at 2622. Unlike those offices, a one-member legislature is an "anomaly." Id.
at 2623. Note that single-member executive offices are not otherwise immune from § 2
coverage-Justice Blackmun addressed only size challenges in his opinion. Id. at 2623 n.5
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen., 501 U.S.
419, 427 (holding that judicial elections are not exempt from § 2 coverage under a "single-
member office" exception), rev'g 498 U.S. 1060 (1991).
155. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396-97 (1991) ("The statute does not create two
separate and distinct rights.").
156. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
157. With only one commissioner to be elected, these plaintiffs will naturally "lose"
every election if they support a different candidate than does a white voting majority
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does not constitute denial of participation, unless participation is
defined solely as the ability to actually have preferred candidates
elected, a proposition soundly rejected in past case law.'58
The measure of effective political participation and "correct"
voting weight is unclear. Is it control of a select few seats'59 or
influence over the electoral fortunes of all representatives in the
governing body?" The Holder dissenters would apparently choose
limited control over wider influence. Using a five-member commis-
sion as the remedy here, African-Americans in Bleckley County
would be given the chance to control one seat if "packed"' 6' into
(assuming the existence of racial bloc voting) since they only constitute 20% of the
county's population.
158. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1971) ("The short of it is that we
are unprepared to hold that district-based elections decided by plurality vote are
unconstitutional in either single- or multi-member districts simply because the supporters
of losing candidates have no legislative seats assigned to them."). The Whitcomb Court
described the "cancellation" of minority voting power as a "mere euphemism for political
defeat at the polls." Id. at 153; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Midland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494,1507 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) ("I had supposed that
the essence of our republican arrangement is that voting minorities lose."), vacated on
reh'g, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (per curiam).
159. According to Justice Thomas, the Court's focus on control of seats is a direct result
of the courts' desire for an objective standard to use in deciding questions of abstract
political theory. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2595 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Thomas continued, "If using control of seats as our standard does not reflect a very
nuanced theory of political participation, it at least has the superficial advantage of
appealing to the 'most easily measured indicia of political power.' " Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 157 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
160. Justice Harlan presented that question in Allen v. State Board of Elections when
he stated, "Under one system, Negroes have some influence in the election of all officers;
under the other, minority groups have more influence in the selection of fewer officers.
If courts cannot intelligently compare such alternatives, it should not be readily inferred
that Congress has required them to undertake the task." 393 U.S. 544,586 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Lani Guinier asked more directly, "Are
blacks better off with one aggressive advocate or several mildly sympathetic listeners?"
GUINIER, supra note 63, at 80.
161. See, eg., Paulette Walker, Foes Crack, Stack, Pack To Weaken Voting Power, USA
TODAY, Aug. 6,1990, at 9A ("Packing is overconcentrating minorities in a district to deny
them a chance to have influence in adjoining districts."). Ms. Walker and others have
argued that providing minorities with their own "safe" districts may dilute votes just as
much as submerging them in majority-white districts, since they will have virtually no
influence on the election of any representatives save their own. See id.; John Leo, The
Progeny of Strange Bedfellows: New Racialism, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1992, at TW4
("[P[ack[ing] minorities into electoral homelands, thus 'whitening' surrounding districts and
increasing the likelihood that black and Hispanic gains will be more than offset by
increased numbers of white Republicans in Congress... is ethnic cleansing American-
style."); Renee Loth, GOP Teaming Up With Minorities: They Hope to Deliver a One-Two
Punch on Legislative, Congressional Redistricting, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 1991, at A29
1995] 1975
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
their own majority-minority district, since they comprise over twenty
percent of the county's total voting age population.16 The Ken-
nedy-O'Connor reasoning skirted this inherently political issue by
narrowly focusing on the potentially limitless nature of size challenges
and thereby avoided the swift undertow of theoretical confrontation
over representational ideology."c Only Justice Thomas's lengthy
concurrence addressed the theoretical underpinnings of dilution
challenges."6 Justice Thomas argued that the federal courts' choice
of single-member districting as their preferred remedy has involved
them in "an enterprise of segregating the races into political
homelands that amounts, in truth, to nothing short of a system of
'political apartheid.' "'I Backhandedly endorsing alternative
("With gerrymandering, undesirable voting blocs are packed or stacked tightly together
to have as narrow an influence as possible or cracked apart into several separate districts
to dilute their power."); see also Chisom v. Roemer 501 U.S. 380,397 n.24 (1991) (noting
that participation in the political process is not denied solely by lack of ability to control
seats, and stating that the argument "rests on the erroneous assumption that a small group
of voters can never influence the outcome of an election") (emphasis added); Puerto Rican
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Gantt, 796 F. Supp. 681, 694-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(finding that prohibited dilution can occur either when large concentrations of minority
voters are fragmented or disbursed into separate electoral districts or where minorities are
concentrated into districts where they constitute an excessive majority); Turner v. State of
Arkansas, 784 F. Supp. 553, 583-84 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (finding that the proposed remedy
of packing black voters into single-member districts also fractured and reduced the number
of blacks in adjacent districts), affd 112 S. Ct. 2296 (1992).
162. The petitioners claimed this line of reasoning wrongly focused not on denial of
political participation, but on a lack of proportional minority representation. Reply Brief
for the Petitioners at 10, Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (No. 91-2012). Since
guaranteed proportionality is prohibited by the Act, absence of proportional representation
is not a permissible argument in a dilution case. See supra notes 80-81.
163. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's view of the
dangerous extensions possible should size challenges be allowed).
164. Because Holder could be dispensed with on relatively narrow grounds, it is not
surprising that only Justice Thomas entered into a deeper discussion of ideology and
principle. The Court was expected to discuss the tougher voting-rights issues involved in
voting rights in Holder's companion case, Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994),
but it declined to do so there as well. See infra note 199. Justice Thomas dissented in De
Grandy and adopted his Holder concurrence as his dissenting opinion. De Grandy, 114
S. Ct. at 2667 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He may have done so to lend more legitimacy to
his narrow interpretation of the Voting Rights Act-expressed as a concurrence in Holder,
it could more easily be seen as an extension of the majority reasoning, rather than as a
radical departure from the mainstream interpretation of the Act in De Grandy if proposed
in a dissenting opinion. Interview with Melissa Saunders, Associate Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Feb. 8, 1995).
165. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2598 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Shaw
v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993)).
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methods such as cumulative voting and transferable votes,"" Justice
Thomas stressed that single-member districting is merely one
"inherently... political" choice among many "competing theories of
political philosophy" which seek to define the fully effective vote, that
is, to define "effective participation in representative
government.;
167
Choosing the correct or fully effective level of political par-
ticipation is the critical issue in a vote dilution case because without
such a benchmark, measuring the dilutive effects of the system in
question would be impossible." In the search for some kind of
objective standard in dilution cases, the federal courts have seized
upon the single-member district as both yardstick and remedy.69
Unfortunately, choosing control of seats as the preferred indicia of
political effectiveness and single-member districting as the preferred
remedy for a violation of section 2 has, according to some, deepened
166. Id. at 2599-600 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The endorsement was
backhanded in its context. Justice Thomas argued that single-member districting is simply
a "less precise expedient" to achieving proportional representation than requiring
registration on racial rolls and dividing power purely on a population basis. Id at 2599
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Consequently, his argument runs, if we are
going to insist on proportional representation as the correct measure of political
effectiveness, we might as well utilize other systems which can produce proportional results
with less difficulty and more accuracy. I& at 2600 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment). For a discussion of some alternative approaches to securing effective political
participation, see infra notes 171-89 and accompanying text.
167. Id. at 2594 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
168. In Justice O'Connor's words:
The phrase vote dilution itself suggests a norm with respect to which the fact of
dilution may be ascertained.... [I]n order to decide whether an electoral system
has made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer, a court
must have an idea in mind of how hard it should be for minority voters to elect
their preferred candidates under an acceptable system.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
169. Cf. Karlan, supra note 138, at 174. Professor Karlan strongly objected to the
federal courts' reliance on geography: "The courts often focus on geography as if it were
more than a means of providing representation, and they ignore effective access to the
political process." Id. She claimed that the Gingles "geographically insular" requirement
was being misperceived by the lower courts, in that it cannot be seen as a threshold
requirement for all § 2 challenges to at-large elections. Id. Rather, according to Professor
Karlan, "intrajurisdiction geography" is relevant only to the extent that it "illuminates the
existence of exclusion from the political process or provides a tool for remedying that
exclusion." Id. at 174-75; see infra notes 171, 188 (discussing Professor Karlan's alternative
approach of "civic inclusion").
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racial divisions, obviated the need for coalition-building, and resulted
in " 'political apartheid' " in the nation.70
So-called "alternative" solutions7 1 to the problem of securing
equal political participation for all should not be dismissed out of
hand. Their driving principle is the "threshold of exclusion," defined
as the percentage of the vote that will guarantee winning a seat in
even the most unfavorable circumstances."7  The threshold of
exclusion in traditional at-large elections and in single-member
districts is fifty percent, meaning that any cohesive larger group
cannot be excluded from electing a representative, while any smaller
group can, at least when the majority group votes strategically.7
Consequently, such systems often deny a sizable portion of the
electorate the opportunity to elect any representatives, resulting in
what one renowned commentator aptly termed "the tyranny of the
majority.'
' 74
170. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2598 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Shaw
v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993)); Leo, supra note 161 ("The relentless search for
mono-racial districts is a sorry business. It makes too much of tribal identity and may
usher in an era in which people get elected primarily by making racial appeals.... [I]t
will... isolate [minority candidates] in racial enclaves and further fragment our politics.");
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Electing by Race, 13 THE AMERICAN LAWYER 50, 52 (1991) ("[W]e
seem to be perpetuating racial divisions by carving a principle of racial separation into our
electoral system."); White Liberals Looking In From The Outside, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Jan. 29, 1995, at 6J (" 'The black districts are blacker, and the white districts are whiter,
radicalizing the electorate in both, which radicalizes the people they elect.' ") (quoting
Ayers Haxton, a progressive white Mississippi legislator); Richard Wolf, Political Lines
Drawn & Redrawn Around Race, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 1992, at 5A (" 'It's almost like
creating these independent townships in South Africa. The whole idea was to create a
truly interracial society.' ") (quoting Rep. John Lewis of Georgia, a well-known civil rights
leader).
171. Karlan, supra note 138, at 223. Professor Karlan identified two approaches to
measuring the presence of vote dilution; one focuses on a "geographic baseline" (single-
member districting), while the other is concerned with "civic inclusion." Id at 175.
According to Professor Karlan, a civic inclusion approach examines vote discrimination on
a broader plane, and requires "an intensely local appraisal of political reality in the
relevant jurisdiction." Id at 180. In her view, geography is an imperfect and formalistic
proxy for the distinctive interests of minority individuals, and may in fact "impair the
development of representatives concerned with the welfare of the entire community." Itd
at 181-82. She stated: "[R]acial vote dilution cannot be treated as simply a geographic
phenomenon.... Unlike the white suburban plaintiffs in Reynolds[ v. Sims], whose voting
strength was diluted because of where they lived, the political power of black citizens is
diluted because of who they are." Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
172. Arend Lijphart et al., The Limited Vote and the Single Non-Transferable Vote:
Lessons from the Japanese & Spanish Examples, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 154, 157 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986).
173. Karlan, supra note 138, at 222.
174. GUINIER, supra note 63, at 3.
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The central feature of alternative, "semiproportional"'"7 elec-
tion systems is that they substantially lower the threshold of exclusion,
thereby increasing the number of groups large enough to elect the
representative of their choice. 6  For example, limited voting
schemes, originally conceived to allow representation to minority
political parties, limit voters to voting for less than a full slate of
representatives.'" In a limited voting scheme, the greater the
difference between the number of seats to be filled and the number
of votes allotted each voter, the lower the threshold of exclusion.
Cumulative voting, another alternative solution, is a more
involved modification of traditional at-large elections: It not only
enhances inclusion, but allows voters to express the intensity of their
preference for a candidate(s).'79 In cumulative voting, voters are
given the same number of votes as there are seats to be filled, but are
allowed to cast more than one vote for a particular candidate.8
The threshold of exclusion is substantially reduced in such a
scheme-it is identical to that of a limited voting system where each
voter is limited to one vote.' Cumulative voting is more flexible
175. MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 124
(Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter MINORITY REPRESENTATION]. The
systems are called "semiproportional" because they provide at least a minimal level of
minority representation, but not proportionality per se, where voting is racially polarized.
Il
176. Karlan, supra note 138, at 223.
177. Limited voting has been used in over half a dozen cities in this country, and is still
used in most Pennsylvania counties, where individuals may vote for only two candidates
out of the three to be elected. MINORITY REPRESENTATION, supra note 175, at 125.
Alabama and Georgia have also adopted some element of limited voting in the last 10
years. Id. at 125-26.
178. Karlan, supra note 138, at 224. The formula for limited voting's threshold of
exclusion is: # votes allotted to each voter + (# votes allotted to each voter + # of seats
to be filled). Id. Thus, under a scheme where three school board members are to be
elected and each voter gets two votes, the threshold of exclusion is 40% [2 + (3+2) = 2/5
= 40%]. Id. It follows that limited systems where voters have only one vote are the most
inclusionary. ld. at 225. Inserting that number into the preceding example gives us a
threshold of exclusion of 25% [1 + (1+3) = 1/4 = 25%]. In that system, a politically
cohesive group constituting more than 25% of the electorate could not be denied
representation if it voted strategically. See icL
179. Id. at 231; see also GUINIER, supra note 63, at 14-16 (discussing the benefits of
cumulative voting). Cumulative voting is very common in the corporate setting, precisely
because it increases minority inclusion in corporate decisionmaking. See Aminai Glazer
et al., Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections: Introducing Strategy into the Equation,
35 S.C. L. REV. 295, 295 (1984) (noting that roughly 20 states require cumulative voting
for corporate elections and another 13 permit its use).
180. Karlan, supra note 138, at 231.
181. Id. at 232. The formula for cumulative voting's threshold of exclusion may be
expressed: 1 + (1 + # of seats to be filled). Id. Thus, in elections for a seven-member
19791995]
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than limited voting-which necessarily restricts the number of
candidates each voter can support to less than the number to be
selected-because it allows voters to gauge for themselves whether
their interests are better served by concentrating all of their support
behind one candidate or by influencing the electoral prospects of
several candidates."m
These and other non-traditional voting systems are in many ways
preferable to the current practice of single-member districting, which
some believe already "creates what amounts to a right to usual,
roughly proportional representation on the part of sizable, compact,
cohesive minority groups.""s  They allow the voters, not the district
drawers, to determine with whom they will unite to elect represen-
tatives, solving the problem of optimizing minority influence." 4
These systems encourage candidates to be responsive to the needs of
the entire community and appeal to all voters in the jurisdiction for
support."m They also give much more influence to minority groups
that are too small or geographically fragmented to meet the Gingles
requirements of size and compactness,' because their votes could
provide the potential swing necessary for any one candidate to win.
In other words, they encourage coalition-building among the voters
body, the threshold of exclusion is extremely low at 12.5% [1 + (1+7) = 1/8 = 12.5%). Id.
182. Id.
183. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 91 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment). Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah recognized the potential incompleteness of
single-member districting as a remedy when he considered the 1982 amendments to the
Act:
[Tihe proposed amendments will ... [move us] in the direction of
providing compact and homogenous political ghettoes for minorities and
conceding them their "share" of officeholders, rather than undertaking
the more difficult (but ultimately more fruitful) task of attempting to
integrate them into the electoral mainstream in this country by requiring
them to engage in negotiation and compromise, and to enter into
electoral coalitions, in order to build their influence. Minority
representation in the most primitive sense may be enhanced by the
proposed amendments; minority influence will suffer enormously.
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 103, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 275-76.
184. "Optimizing" as used here refers only to the necessity of ensuring an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of choice,
as guaranteed by the Act. Note that these systems do not in any way mandate, contrary
to Justice Thomas's assertions, Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2599-2600, proportionality-they
simply allow the voters an opportunity to join together in support of a candidate or
candidates and vote strategically. See supra note 166 (discussing Justice Thomas's view).
185. See Karlan, supra note 138, at 226-27. There is some concern on this point about
accountability in such a jurisdiction-wide arrangement, but many would say that
accountability is not a particular strongpoint of the current system either.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
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and concern for all citizens among the legislators' 87 while reducing
the heavy load on the federal courts and state legislatures.Y It is
perplexing that our courts feel they must resort to cramming certain
groups into legislative districts just to ensure their election of a
representative. It is equally vexing that those representatives will be
largely ignored upon reaching office, because they will still constitute
a minority."
The desire for equal political participation must be tempered with
rationality. To allow a minority group to challenge a single-commis-
sioner scheme of government, which is in itself a single-member
district, and suggest a hypothetical expanded commission size by
which to measure dilution, would be to fabricate a voting rights
violation." Bleckley County, Georgia does not have a racially
polarized voting environment in the modern day,'9' and there was
187. The current favor for single-member districting may be accomplishing the exact
opposite-as one commentator put it, "The cost of rigging the system to elect more
minorities may... be a net loss in legislative support for inner-city schools, anti-poverty
programs, and civil rights bills," due to the reduction of overall influence, which "leav[es]
many white officeholders with little incentive to court [minorities]." Taylor, supra note
170, at 52.
188. Cf. Karlan, supra note 138, at 179-82 (discussing her "civic inclusion" philosophy
of representative democracy). Professor Karlan states that a civic inclusion approach
"rests on a belief in the distinctive values that inclusion in governmental decisionmaking
brings: a sense of connectedness to the community and of equal political dignity; greater
readiness to acquiesce in governmental decisions and hence broader consent and
legitimacy; and more informed, equitable, and intelligent governmental decisionmaking."
Id. at 180.
189. Solutions to this additional problem have also been proposed by many commen-
tators. Se4 e.g., GUINIER, supra note 63, at 16-17 (exploring the use of super-majority
voting); Karlan, supra note 138, at 236-48 (arguing for inclusionary approaches to the
legislative process, including rotating power positions and super-majority voting rules);
MINORITY REPRESENTATION, supra note 175, at 127-28 (discussing power sharing devices
designed to improve the "proportionate influence" of elected representatives).
190. Cf. McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 947 (7th Cir. 1988) ("It is not
reasonable to add seats to the [bodies in question] essentially to create a section 2
violation."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989); see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying
text.
191. Analysis of recent elections in the county showed little statistical evidence of
racially polarized voting. Brief for the Petitioners at 10, Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581
(1994) (No. 91-2012). In fact, black candidate Robert Benham received over half of his
votes in Bleckley County from white voters when he ran for the Georgia Court of
Appeals. Id. Black candidate Willie Basby won three at-large city council elections for
the City of Cochran, twice by receiving a majority of the votes cast. Id. Councilman
Basby himself even testified that white voters would not discriminate against a qualified
black candidate, and that personal voter contact, name recognition, and consensus building
win elections in Bleckley County. Id. David Walker, president of the local NAACP
chapter, also testified at trial that a qualified black candidate for county commissioner
could win, even though no minority candidate has ever run for the office. Id. at 23 n.18.
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evidence at trial of a lack of minority political cohesion and or-
ganization."9 In fact, there was an overall lack of evidence tending
to show that the single-commissioner system is not the best way to
run a small county like Bleckley for the benefit of all its citizens,
regardless of their race or ethnicity.
In Holder, the Court was faced once again with the problem
inherent in all section 2 vote dilution claims: How are the courts to
identify vote dilution, measure its effects, and decide whether section
2 has been violated? The Court did not address that problem,
choosing instead to decide the case on the readily available, narrow
ground that size challenges are not feasible. Indeed, notwithstanding
the availability of a "benchmark" by which to measure the dilutive
effects of a single commissioner system in this case, 93 it is apparent
that to allow dilution challenges to size would embroil lower courts in
even more complicated, fact-intensive inquiries than those already
required."'4 The use of a hypothetical, expanded government body
size for purposes of the dilution comparison would presuppose a
section 2 violation and bypass the geographical compactness re-
quirement of Gingles.9s
Congress has given the judiciary a "difficult responsibility" in the
area of voting rights,'96 requiring it to balance the competing
Even the respondents testified that they were unaware of any racial appeals in recent
elections. Holder, 757 F. Supp. at 1562 n.2. The district court observed that Councilman
Basby's testimony "serve[d] less as evidence of racially polarized voting and more as a
lesson in the dynamics of grass roots political campaigning," and stated, "Nothing in the
plaintiff's evidence ... leads this court to a conclusion that voting on local levels is racially
polarized." Id. at 1573-74.
192. Dr. Bernadette Loftin, town historian, researched the issue and determined that
there was no evidence of political organization among black citizens in Bleckley County.
Brief for the Petitioners at 36 n.29, Holder (No. 91-2012). NAACP chapter president
Walker testified that there are differences of opinion in the Bleckley County black
community on political matters, and that the black community as a whole does not vote
the same way in each election. Id. City Councilman Basby testified that the black
community showed very little interest in the 1986 referendum to change the form of
county government, which was rejected by the county's voters. ld.; see supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 145-47, 151-54 and accompanying text.
194. Cf. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2590 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("The wide range of possibilities makes the choice inherently stan-
dardless.").
195. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text; see also supra note 99.
196. See Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2625 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); cf
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) ("Even if serious problems lie ahead in
applying ['totality of circumstances' inquiry under § 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act], that
task, difficult as it may prove to be, cannot justify a judicially created limitation on the
coverage of the broadly worded statute.").
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congressional concerns of eliminating voting discrimination and
avoiding a system of interest group representation."i The federal
courts have tried valiantly to effectuate that dual purpose and are now
firmly entrenched in the "political thicket" of reapportionment,19
struggling with questions of how much is too much, how bizarre is too
bizarre, and how few are too few. Taken together, Holder and its
companion case Johnson v. De Grandy'9 evidence the Court's
197. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (" 'There is an inherent
tension between what Congress wished to do and what it wished to avoid'--between
Congress' [sic] 'inten[t] to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under § 2' and its intent
to avoid 'creat[ing] a right to proportional representation for minority voters.' ") (quoting
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 84 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(last alteration in original)). The former concern is self-evident-the whole purpose of the
Act was to eliminate vote discrimination. See supra text accompanying note 51. The latter
is evidenced in the "Dole Compromise," see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text, and
in the remarks of the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, which stated that "the
framers of our Federal Government rejected official recognition of interest groups as a
basis for representation [i.e. rejected proportionality] and instead chose the individual as
the primary unit of government." S. REP. No. 417, supra note 52, at 139, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 311 (emphasis added). The Subcommittee expressed its concern with the
new results test, stating, "Thus launched in search of a remedy involving results, the
subcommittee believes that courts would have to solve the problem of measuring that
remedy by distributional concepts of equity which are indistinguishable from the concept
of proportionality." Id at 140, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 312.
The Senate Judiciary Committee recognized that the new results test was "not an easy
test," but claimed that minority voters "emerge[d] from virtual exclusion from the electoral
process" only after its adoption by some lower federal courts. Id. at 31, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 209. The Committee addressed all of the arguments against the test, most
of which focused on the dangers of proportionality and "racial quotas," and found the
disclaimer against guaranteed proportionality sufficient to assuage those concerns. 1d. at
30-35, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208-13.
198. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
199. 114 S. Ct 2647 (1994). The legal community did not expect the Court to reach
the deeper voting rights issues in Holder, but it very much expected the Court to do so in
De Grandy. Interview with Melissa Saunders, Associate Piofessor of Law, University of
North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Feb. 8, 1995). De Grandy, a
controversial reapportionment case, presented the Court with the ideal opportunity to
address the core issues involved in the voting rights arena.
De Grandy involved the vote dilution claim of a consolidated group of minority voters
against Florida's reapportionment plan for the state's single-member Senate and House
districts. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2651-52. The voters claimed that the districts used
since 1982 were malapportioned, failing to reflect changes in the State's population during
the ensuing decade, even though they provided representation which was roughly
proportional to the minority groups' share of the area's voting-age population. Id. at 2651.
The-district court found that more "majority-minority" districts could be drawn, and after
reviewing the "totality of the circumstances," concluded that the state's reapportionment
plan impermissibly diluted the voting strength of the plaintiff groups. Id. at 2652-53.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the states have no obligation to "guarantee
a political feast" to minority voters by maximizing the number of minority "influence
districts," id. at 2660; see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 94 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
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reluctance to revisit the basis of the vote dilution inquiry, as well as
its increasingly conservative view of the Voting Rights Act.' ° While
Holder cut off one branch of the "political thicket," it did not aid the
resolution of the basic dilemma of voting rights
jurisprudence-determining "how hard it 'should' be""' for minority
voters to elect representatives.
MARTIN PATRICK AVERILL
concurring in the judgment) ("There is substantial doubt that Congress intended 'undiluted
minority voting strength' to mean 'maximum feasible minority voting strength.' "), but also
held that rough proportionality in representation does not provide a "safe harbor" for
apportionment plans. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2660. Instead, the Court found that
proportionality is merely one important factor to consider in examining the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether dilution exists. Id. at 2661; see supra notes 77-78, 88-
90 and accompanying text (discussing the "totality of the circumstances" inquiry). The
legal community's high expectations were doused, as the Court sidestepped the core issues
once again. It refused to clarify the Gingles three-prong test (the plaintiff groups satisfied
all three prongs yet still lost), refused to state exactly what effect rough proportionality has
on the dilution inquiry (claiming that it was not dispositive, but relying heavily on it to find
an absence of dilution), and relied solely on the ambiguous "totality of the circumstances"
test to uphold Florida's proposed reapportionment plan.
200. See High Court Continues to Narrow Its Reading of Voting Rights Act, STAR
TRIBUNE, July 1, 1994, at 13A (" 'Both of these cases are a continuation of the
conservative trend in the Court's view of voting rights cases.' ") (quoting Neil Bradley, an
American Civil Liberties Union lawyer involved in Holder); id. (" 'The Court's decisions
... are a major disappointment. ... [T]hey are a continuation of the rollback of civil
rights we've seen under the Rehnquist Court.' ") (quoting Elliot Mincberg of People for
the American Way, a liberal lobbying group).
201. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 88 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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